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Much debate has been raging in development discourse about the role of the state in
development economics. Neo liberal theorists call for the state to remove itself from the
process and leave markets to determine the direction of economic development. The
challenge to this theory was reinforced by the success of the East Asian counties in
encouraging economic development through a process which involved extensive state
intervention. The process of globalisation has added a new dimension to this debate
where states are increasingly feeling the need to take steps to protect their economies
from the negative impacts of globalisation and take other steps so that the positive
rewards can be reaped.
The debate of this interaction between the state and economic forces is evident on all
levels of governance, from the national to the local. Theorists such as Stone, Molotch,
Logan and Stoker have researched this question on the local level in cities in the United
States. They found that there is extensive interaction between political and economic
bodies for the economic development of urban spaces. Specifically, these two major
groups are represented by an elite grouping of individuals who play an important role in
the planning and implementing of development initiatives.
This study attempts to examine this relationship of the economic elite and political elite
in the city of Durban. This is particularly relevant in the context of the critical need for
economic development in the city and the mandate that the city is given by national
legislation to promote such development. The study furthermore examines the extent to
which the role players in this interaction are part of the post-Apartheid 'new' elite, or if
the interactive process is still dominated by the 'old' white elite.
The interactions were found to be limited to a 'project' basis which did not reflect a
coalition in terms of the sharing of strategic decision making and planning. Furthermore,
this process is dominated by the traditional white, corporate elite, although non-white
individuals do have key roles in this process. There is however, a stark absence of a new
non-white elite in the city who could emerge as an important force in encouraging
development initiatives which will contribute to the economic development of the city.
However, projects are been implemented that are being driven by individuals who are
members of a economic or political elite grouping. These projects are based on a trickle
down approach where the growth is presumed to filter down and positively affect the
poorer members of Durban. There is a real possibility however, as various theorist have
warned, that such projects currently being implemented by the elite in the city, might
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In his opening address to the 2001 Durban Growth Summit Mr. Mike Mabuyakhulu, the
KwaZulu-Natal Minister of Economic Development and Tourism, welcomes the
'partners of the growth coalition'. The immediate question this raises is whether there is
in fact a "growth coalition" ; that is to say , whether there is a political and economic
elite in the urban area of Durban working together for the economic development of the
city.
There is little doubt that the port city of Durban ' s economy is in senous need of
restructuring and economic development. In 1999, The Durban Unicity commissioned
the international consultancy company, the Monitor Group to conduct research into
Durban's economy with a view to developing a long-term development strategy for the
city. 1 Their findings show that a new development path will have to be forged in the
city . Continuing with the current growth path would mean: a slide to real economic
crisis within the next 10-15 years, a significant drop in per capita income,
unemployment increasing by an additional 350 000, and the emigration of skilled
persons out of the city.
The Monitor Group argue that the economic development of the city is as important for
the businesses based in the city as it is for the city itself. The researchers project that the
current economic path will result in a significant decrease in revenue to the city, which
will at the same time have to deal with increasing demands for services. (Monitor
Report, 2000:20) With the city council being heavily reliant on rates generated from
business for its operating income, the folding or relocation of business and industry will
negatively impact on the city's ability to finance it's responsibilities. Therefore, for the
local state and for businesses tied in to the local economy, the state of the city's
I Following the 2000 local government elections, the various metro councils in Durban were united into a
single metro council, termed a Unicity. The same process occurred in various other cities in the country. A
map of Durban can be found at Appendix B.
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economy is an important determinant of their own successes. Clearly, therefore, some
kind of urban developmental strategy is urgently required.
The foundation for greater business and political elite interaction on the local level has
been laid at the national level of government. Growth coalitions usually employ a more
business oriented economic strategy whereby growth is presumed to trickle down and
positively effect all segments of society. The South African government has largely
abandoned its Reconstruction and Development Programme in favour of Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). As the name suggests, this strategy is in line
with global trends towards the emphasi s on growth oriented, export emphasised,
economic development.
The South African government is also opening up the trade borders of the country, by
lifting trade barriers and tariffs. This is placing pressure on businesses in the country in
that they are now having to compete with companies from all over the world without
their previous protection. South African cities are also having to ensure that their
economies are structured in such a way to ensure that increasingly mobile capital is
invested (and stays) in the city. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (WPLG)
reinforces this local government responsibility, stating that cities must attract investment
by promoting comparative advantage s in industries and other enterprises.
"Extreme rapid changes at the global, regional, national and local levels are
forcing local communities to rethink the way they are organised and governed.
All over the world, communities must find new ways to sustain their economies,
build their societies, protect their environments, improve personal safety.... and
eliminate poverty" (South Africa WPLG 1998:24)
Cities like Durban are thus required to be internationally competitive so as to ward off
the possible negative effects of globalisation and reap the benefits by developing their
comparative advantage.
The effects of these changing global and national trends is felt by both business and
local government, and is laying the ground for greater co-operation between these two
elite. National government in South African is in fact explicitly encouraging greater co-
operation in the local sphere in encouraging public-private partnerships (PPP).
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Municipalities are encouraged to actively develop ways to leverage resources and
investment from the private as well as public sectors. (Sough Africa, WPLG 1998:23)
"Substantial benefits can be derived from public-public partnerships, and
municipalities are encouraged to explore the options as individual organisations
and through organised local government associations." (South Africa, WPLG,
1998:71)
While this approach is emphasised in terms of service provision and infrastructure
building, this is not exclusively the case.
The other important contextual change that is opening up space for greater local
development initiatives is the significant taking place at the legislative level of
government. Local government is now a sphere of government in its own right and is no
longer merely a function of the national or provincial government. It is an integral
component of the democratic state of the country and local government is afforded, at
least in principle, equal ranking with national and provincial government tiers. (South
Africa, WPLG, 1998:35) Thus, through national .policy prescriptions, the local
government of Durban has been mandated with and given the responsibility to act
relatively autonomously to aid economic development within the city boundaries. A key
factor in this new system of governance is that it is mandated to be developmental, with
local government having responsibilities such as poverty alleviation, local economic
development and empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals. In particular,
the political elite is encouraged to actively engage with the economic elite in achieving
these goals.
So who are the economic and political elite who co-operate to achieve economic
development? This is a complicated question, and this paper will concentrate on the
main actors emerging from coalition theories ; i.e. the local political elite and the
business elite. This study does not include traditional leadership as part of the political
elite. While political leaders in their own right, the role of this indigenous local
government in the Unicity is still being contested on a national level. 1 For this reason,
I The extension of the Unicity boundaries by 68 % has meant that 16 traditional authority areas are
incorporated. The WPLG does not give these traditional authorities any direct decision making power on
development issues. The powers and roles of the traditional leaders are still being defined under
consultation. (Khan & Lootvoet, 2001 : I0)
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this study concentrates only on those members of the political elite who are elected
through a democratic process. The focus on the political elite is thus around the city
council.' The focus on the economic elite will be on those individuals who are reputed to
be leaders and have important deci sion-making powers in the city. Both the managers of
large businesses and entrepreneurs will therefore be examined.
The post-Apartheid South Africa presents an interesting dynamic to this study as it has
seen the emergence of new political and economic role players. Previously excluded
individuals are now being given opportunities and actively encouraged through policies
such as Affirmative Action (AA) to become leaders in the economic and political
worlds. This new emerging elite is filling the roles previously reserved for the white
elite. Durban is a particularly interesting location of study because it is home to the
largest concentration of people who originate from India. While not excluded to the
extent of the black race· group, they too were limited in economic and political
aspirations. Although not exclusively so, this research concentrates on this 'new' elite.
Does the traditional white elite still dominate this Durban coalition, or has the new black
elite come to the fore to become prominent players In the drive for economic
development of the city? W lei is driving this process, - the political elite or the
economic elite? These are some of the questions that this research aims to answer with a
view to highlighting the implications that this holds for development within the city
boundaries. A substantial body of literature exists, both historical and contemporary,
elite theory. A lot of research has also been conducted on elite interaction in the context
of economic development. Indeed, studies have been made on the elite interaction
during the history of Durban's establishment. However, elite interaction has not been
examined in the specific context that Durban currently finds itself. This paper sets out to
address this.
I The municipal election of the fifth of December 2000 brought in the first truly democratic local
government. Until then, local government was subjec ted to provisions overseeing a transformation
process.
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The paper therefore aims to consider the following questions;
• Who is the elite in Durban?
• On what levels are they interacting?
• What are the forums for this interaction?
• Who drives this process for economic development, the econormc elite or the
political elite?
• To what extent are the 'new' elite major players or do the traditional white elite still
hold the dominant influencing powers?
This chapter ends with an explanation of the methodology employed in this study. This
is followed in Chapter Two by an examination of the coalition theories and the elite
theories that frame this research. The current situation in Durban is determined largely
by historical circumstances. Chapter Three gives a brief examination of these
circumstances, with particular reference to the history of eli~e interaction in Durban, and
the emergence of a new elite. Chapter Four gives an analysis of the current interactions
of the elite for economic development in the city. This paper ends with Chapter Five,
with a summary of the findings and an examination of the possible implications that
arise from this.
Limitations of the study
By the very nature of elites, they are busy individuals with great responsibilities. For this
reason access to all of the elite was not possible. Furthermore, time and space constraints
meant that not all of the elite in the city could be interviewed. Furthermore, the province
of Kwa-Zulu Natal has been home to large-scale political violence which still flares up
periodically. Much of the antagonism was along party lines, between the African
National Congress (ANC) aligned United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the
Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP). Furthermore, the issue of racial discrimination is still very
real for all race groups. These two factors could have contributed to bias in responses, or
refusals to answer particular questions.
The author therefore acknowledges that there are possible gaps in this paper.
Furthermore, because of the ease of identification and access, the paper could be slanted
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towards an examination of those elite members who are actively involved in the process
of economic development. Conversely, individuals who by circumstances, choice or
omission, could have been excluded from this process. However, this study is not meant
to create a comprehensive theory regarding elite interaction in the city in this time frame.
Rather, it is exploratory in nature, and hopefully provides a snapshot view of some of
the issues and interactions that occur. It is therefore hoped that this study raises more
questions than it answers and creates a backdrop for future research to investigate in
more detail some of the issues that are raised.
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1.2 Methodology
This research utilises both primary and secondary research methods.
Primary Sources
Numerous interviews were conducted with the economic and political elites in Durban.
A third category of elite was identified which fits between these two categories, that of
the parastatal elite. One interview was therefore conducted with the CEO of the Port of
Natal. The political elite were selected using Pareto' s simple definition of elite being the
'top' group (Parry, 1969:35). Thus, the political elite selected were considered as the ten
members of the executive committee of the Unicity Council. Of the nine approached,
five elite individuals, from various political parties and backgrounds, agreed to be
interviewed.
Selection of the economic elite proved to be more complex.. It is difficult to ascertain
what constitutes 'top' when it comes to business. An examination of individual annual
income would make this selection process much easier, but is clearly not practical and
constitutes an invasion of privacy. A variety of methods were therefore employed to
target the new economic elite. Two important theorists in this regard are Robert A Dahl,
who uses the 'decision making approach' and Floyd Hunter, who makes use of a
'reputational approach' to identify the elite. Dahl , (1961) looking atthe city of New
Haven, examined certain key issues in the city in order to ascertain how decisions are
made and who actually has the power to influence these decisions. Those who held the
major decision-making powers, he identified as the economic, social and political elite.
Hunter (1953) sees that the reputation of having power as being essential for decision
making and for policy execution. (Hunter 1953:2) He found the people in power by
looking at people in prominent positions in business, government, civic associations and
society activities. Hunter asked the other people on his list how well they knew the
others on the list, ranging from, "know well". to "not known". He thus concluded that
"the professional persons who carry out the decisions of the policy-making group are
definitely differentiated from the top leaders in rates of interaction and in degree of
acquaintance with the top leaders." (Hunter 1953:73) He further found that the same
people were named as influential and consequently able to 'move things' in the city.
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(Hunter 1953:73) Thus, he isolated a group of men who were the most powerful in the
city. The methodology of this research is a combination of these above two methods; i.e.
the elite are those who have important decision making power and/or those reputed to
have that power.
While this research concentrates on the 'new' emerging elite , it was decided not to make
this as exclusive criteria. This is because of the possibility that members of the old
established elite might still being important role players in the city or, at the very least,
might make important contributions to make to this study.
Elite Selections
1. Top businesses in Durban were examined to establish which individuals held
important decision making power. In particular, the Board of Directors of these
companies were examined. No data exists for Durban in terms of annual turnover,
however the Durban Chamber of Commerce has compiled a list for top businesses in
KZN for the year 2000 in terms of number of employees. This might not be a true
reflection of economic power in the city as labour intensive companies might
outrank capital intensive companies. However, it does serve as a good starting point
for the analysis. Durban-based business and businesses with their headquarters in
Durban were taken from this list, and lists of the boards of directors were obtained
from these companies. Key members of the board were highlighted as possible
holders of significant decision-making power and approached for interviews. This
fits in with Dahl' s decision making approach where those who hold significant
decision making power are members of the elite.
2. Local newspapers from the past five years were examined to determine which
businessmen or women featured prominently. Those featured were approached for
interviews. This process was done mostly through internet searches.
3. Forums for business interaction, both amongst different businesses and between the
local state and business arena, were examined to discover who features prominently
and should therefore be targeted. Some of these forums include the Durban
Chamber of Commerce (DCC), the Board of the Durban Investment Promotion
Agency (DIPA) and those attending the various Durban Growth Summits. The
author is aware that this targeting method will provide a skewed result as it clearly
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highlights those individuals who play an active role around issues of economic
development. However, it is hoped that the remaining two targeting mechanisms
counterbalance this weighting.
4. Utilising Hunter's reputational approach, respondents were asked during the
interview process to name the most important economic role players in the city. The
focus here was on new and emerging elite individuals. The reputational approach, as
well as contributing to contributing to answering the question 'who are the elite',
proved useful as a "snowball" method to obtain names of other potential elite to
interview.
5. The council has implemented an Affirmative Procurement Policy for tenders
emerging from the city. This policy of preferential opportunities to previously
disadvantaged groups by giving preferential access to tender contracts, aims to give a
large number of high value tenders to a new group of businessmen. The study
therefore looked at the owners of companies who received the highest accumulated
value of tenders in a one-year period from January 2000 to December 2000. A
selection of these businessmen and women were also approached for interviews.
6. All members of the Unicity's Executive Council were approached for interviews.
As well as the political and economic elite, two observers to the process of economic
development in the city were interviewed as well as a bureaucrat from the tenders office.
A list of the respondents can be found at Appendix A.
As a further primary source, an examination was made of local, provincial and national
government documents relevant to this research.
Secondary Sources
This research intends to fill a gap in the academic discourse around this particular
subject. Thus, no literature was available on this specific subject. Research was first
undertaken to situate this study in a theoretical framework around various particular
issues. Literature of a theoretical nature was consulted around the issues of:-
1. Urban elites and their interactions
2. Economic development in urban areas
3. The role players in urban economic development.
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The second major part of the secondary research was to examine the context that frames
this case study. Literature about global and national changes was referred to. An
investigation was made into the current economic development environment in which
Durban finds itself and the future implications of this. The Monitor Report, a study
done on Durban's economy, local government policies emanating from that report, and
media reports concerning relevant issues were examined.
Developments impacting on the economic development of the city such as the ICC,
Point Waterfront, the Port and the development of the Northern Corridor of the city were
examined, primarily through media articles of the local newspapers.
Finally, an examination was made of the historical background to the study. Literature
concerning issues related to the initial colonisation of the city to the beginning of the
1990' s was examined. Here, literature around elites and their contribution to the
development of the city was given particular attention, as was literature related to the
creation of a non-white elite. Included in this secondary list-were more contemporary
writings on related topics.
Interviews
A total of 12 formal interviews and one informal interview were conducted. A list of
interviewees can be found at Appendix A. All interviews were conducted by the author
except for one that was conducted in conjunction with Bill Freund, and one conducted
by Bill Freund alone. The interviews lasted from between 30 minutes to one hour. They
were recorded and later transcribed.
The sensitive nature of some of the questions presented a methodological challenge to
the research. For this reason a semi-structured interview methodology was used. The
benefit of such methodology is that. "the interviewed subjects' viewpoints are more
likely to be expressed in a relatively openly designed interview situation than in a
standardised interview". (Flick 1998:76) Furthermore, the interviewer could avoid
certain questions at inappropriate times and return to them at later stages in the interview
process. Alternatively, the question can be probed in various ways to overcome this
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potential reluctance to answer direct questions. To encourage this process, an open-
ended question methodology was used.
Analysis of the Data
Because of the unstructured nature of the interviews, the transcriptions had to be
reordered around the major themes of this research. The responses were then analysed
using conventional content analysis techniques. The content of the interviews, once
reordered around the specific questions of the research, were summarised. Once this had
been done, the interviews were compared to establish important themes and interactions.
Issues of Confidentiality
All respondents were briefed on the purpose of the study. All agreed to their responses
and quotes being used in this paper. However, one respondent requested that certain
sections of the interviews remain anonymous. Therefore, references are made to
individuals throughout the paper, but where anonymity was requested the references are
framed as general sentiments.
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CHAPTER TWO
Elite and Elite Interaction in the Local Arena
The purpose of this chapter is to outline some theories around the issues to be
investigated in this research. This literature review is based largely on analyses done in
the cities of the USA. In stark contrast to the South African context, there has been a
significant amount of research into elite formation in the USA. What this research has
found is that in the USA, local government has a large degree of autonomy when
compared to, say the UK. The level of autonomy of the local government vis a vis the
national governing body is an important determinant of the direction of local
government policy initiatives. (Swilling 1997:5) Furthermore, the fragmented nature of
USA local structures has resulted in economic competition between areas in order to
attract investment so that local tax bases can be maintained or improved. In the UK, on
the other hand, because resources are distributed centrally to richer or poorer areas, there
is less incentive to compete. (Judge et al 1998:12) Since the onset of democracy, cities in
South Africa have enjoyed far greater levels of autonomy, and development initiatives
are partly centred around attracting investment in competition with other cities in the
country. For these reasons, this paper relies heavily on research coming out of the US.
The chapter begins with an examination of general elite theory. This is followed by a
brief review of some of the changing contexts that are affecting urban governance.
These contexts, coalition theorists argue, are resulting in greater interaction and co-
operation between the elite to aid urban governance. The paper then moves on to
examine the two main urban coalition theories; Clarence Stone's Regime Theory and
Harvey Molotch's Growth Machine theory. Specifically, it will examine the following
questions: Why are the elite interacting? From where does the impetus for this
interaction come? And finally, who is excluded in such a process? Both of these theories
argue that the most important actors in a coalition of interests for urban development, are
the political elite and the business elite. This chapter therefore ends with a brief




The empirical focus of this study is the new economic and political elites in the city of
Durban. However, it is necessary to look briefly at broader elite theories. Pareto defined
the elite as being the 'top' people in their chosen activity, whether it be in governing,
thieving, or in a professional sense. (Parry, 1969:35) These 'top' people as a group
therefore constitutes an 'elite'. Other theorists have narrowed this definition down.
Classical Elitists see the elite as being a group who have certain qualities and social
opportunities that grant them a position above others. (Parry 1969:35) In opposition to
these elite theories are Marxist theories which state that no matter what class leaders
come from, they are representative of the dominant economic class. (Parry, 1969:28)
Between these two extremes are theorists who try to find a synthesis between elitist and
Marxist thinking. Such theorists hold that leadership needs to be placed ·in wider
contexts.
On the one side of the argument, are pluralists such as Dahl and Wolfinger. Pluralists
argue that power is fragmented and decentralised. In rejecting elite theory concepts of a
core elite group, Pluralists emphasise that decision-makers are still subject to popular
control that assures the permeable nature of the political system. (Cummings, 1988:15)
It is precisely because of the interaction of these interests, that a legitimate authority is
created. (Cummings, 1998:14) Here democratic principles can be seen to form the .core
to the theory. However, pluralists do not presume that the fragmented nature of power
means that everyone has equal access to the system. They see that some interest groups,
by virtue of their resources and abilities, are better able to put forward their cases and
hold greater influence. However, pluralists argue that all groups do have some kind of
access.
Dahl, a leading pluralist, set out to examine this question in the American City of New
Haven. He examined different groups of leaders to see what kind of overlap and
interaction occurred around different issue areas of urban governance. The major
questions 'that Dahl (1961) examines are; whether or not people who have access to
resources automatically gain access to other types of resources. He also asks how
decisions are made and who actually has the power to influence these decisions. What
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kind of coherence is there within the decision making structures? Is it oligarchic or
pluralistic? (Dahl , 1961:8) Specifically, he examined the interaction between 'economic
notables ' , the 'social notables ' and those who hold political power . He found that there
is no main power group that governs the society. Because of the pluralist nature of
society, different people were involved in different ' issue areas'. Dahl found that society
in New Haven was stratified in that some groups were more active in politics that others.
The issue areas that he examined were the local elections, urban renewal and education,
finding , that with very few exceptions, there was very little overlap between the different
issues by the different leaders. (Parry 1969:67) Different elites made different decision
in different issue areas. (Judge 1998:20) Judge however highlight s that a major criticism
of Dahl' s methodology and chosen issue areas is that they would lead to the discovery of
a pluralist process. (Judge, 1998: 18) Importantly for this study however , he found that
economic notables participated more than other groups in public affairs, but largely only
around the issue of urban redevelopment. (Dahl 1961:69) This was to be expected
because "urban redevelopment bore a comparatively direct and self evident relationship
to the personal or corporate prosperity of the economic notables." (Dahl :71) Since this
study is centred around issues of economic development, this finding is particularly
relevant. A further important criticism of Dahl' s finding s is based largely on the view
that he downplays the very important role of business, by relegating them to a mere
interest group. "Certain interest - especially business interests - have such a crucial role
in society that no government , local or central can afford to ignore their interest."
(Judge 1998:30, quoting Stoker, 1991)
On the opposite side of the urban governance theoretical spectrum, lie elite theorists.
Elite theory posits that urban governments are ruled by a small number of like-minded
people who are usually linked to business interests. As such it is a reflection of the
hierarchical makeup of society. (Harding 1998:36) Mill s (1956), put forward the view
that the 'power elite' are a group that represent the leaders in various hierarchies, such as
social, economic, or military. Mills saw that "with growing bureaucratisation, power
became concentrated within large business corporations, the central executive machinery
of government and the military establi shment ." (Harding 1998:37) Mills thus suggests
that the question of who the elite are, needs to be examined in both an economic,
political and social context. Floyd Hunter, a further prominent elite theorist, in his study
of Atlanta, USA, found that the city decision makers had a core group of elite policy
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makers. These were identified by a reputational approach whereby he perceived those
who had the greatest power where those who were perceived to have that power. He
found the men in power by looking at people in prominent positions in business,
government, civic associations and society activities. (Hunter 1953: 11) Hunter asked the
other people on his list how well they knew the others on the list, ranging from, "know
well" to "not known." He found that of the group in the upper tier of society, all 35
people interviewed knew each other. On the other hand, the professional group below
this upper tier knew, on average, only 7 other people on this list 'well' or better".
(Hunter 1953:73) He thus concluded that "the professional persons who carry out the
decisions of the policy-making group are definitely differentiated from the top leaders in
rates of interaction and in degree of acquaintance with the top leaders." (Hunter
1953:73) He further found that the same people were named as influential and
consequently able to 'move things' in the city. (Hunter 1953:73) Thus, he isolated a
group of men who were the most powerful in the city. They interact among themselves
and chose each other as leaders. (Hunter 1953:74) Here, pol icy formulation was done in
accordance with personal interest, and not through a process of translating electorate
desires into policy. Furthermore, he found that business interests dominated this core
policy making group. (Harding 1998:39) "Local representative democracy in the US was
just a smokescreen for dominant economic interests." (Harding 1998:39)
Both pluralist and elite theories agree, however, on the fact that there are unequal
interests within society. Most prominent amongst the privileged vis-a-vis decision-
making power and influence, are the political elite and the business elite: A major
criticism, however, of both these theories is that they concentrate too heavily on urban
geographic areas and largely ignore the importance of non-local influences on local
policy making. (Harding 1998:41) Examples of such influences are the non-local
ownership of productive forces, the new international division of labour, and the
influences of higher levels of government. It is such influences that have led to the
development of middle ground theories, which recognise these external forces and see
the result as being co-operative policy making in urban areas to overcome the challenges
presented to urban areas from such forces. These theories lie between the two
extremities of the debate and argue that a kind of co-operation exists, primarily between
the business elite and the political elite in order to effect urban governance. Notable
theories in this school are the growth machine theories of, for example, Molotch and
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Logan, and the regime theory of, for example, Stone and Stoker. In line with pluralists
and elitists, machine and regime theorists also recognise the dominance of business and
local government interests in such co-operation. Before going on to a discussion of these
theories, this paper will briefly examine the contexts which are resulting in the necessity
for greater co-ordination and co-operation in urban areas between various players.
Globalisation is having a major impact on all aspects of civil, political and economic
life. Numerous debates rage around the impact that this is having on the ability of the
nation state to legislate to achieve national agendas. I Of concern to this paper is the
implication of globalisation on the state and the economy at a local level. Some of the
ways that the world economy is restructuring are that production and service functions
are decentralising on an international level, as are global financial and commodity
markets, while the control of these functions is being centralised within the large
corporations. (Tomlinson 1994:10) This has important implications for cities. Cities are
having to plan and legislate so as to attract investment , build on their comparative
advantages, and ensure that they are not marginalised by the nature of the globalised
market to seek out locations which will maximise their profits and minimise their costs.
The traditional roles of cities revolved around issues of the provision of services and
infrastructure. These roles are now expanding to incorporate moves to stimulate the
economy, create new jobs, attract investment, and ultimately ensure a greater
contribution to the tax base of the city . Partnerships between the economic and political
elite are one of the methods utilised to achieve these aims. The interaction of political
role players and economic role players has received extensive attention in the debates of
the past few decades surrounding the neo-liberal policies of the 'rolling back of the
state' and the 'leaving economics to the markets'. The success of the 'Asian Tiger'
countries specifically due to state intervention in the economy has further increased the
intensity of these debates. The World Bank sees neo-liberal change as positive, allowing
for a "shift in the role of central government from direct providers of urban services and
infrastructure...to creating a regulatory and financial environment in which enterprises,
I This paper does not with to involve itself around these debates. For further reading on the economic and
political implications, consult the following articles; Martin, R., Stateless Monies, Global Financial
Integration and National Economic Autonomy: The End of Geography? In S. Corbridge, R. Martin and N.
Thrift (eds), Money, Power and Space, Oxford, 1994, & Amin , A & Malmberg, A., Competing Structural
and Institutional Influences on the Geography of Production in Europe, in A. Amin, (ed) Post Fordism: A
Reader, Oxford, 1994.
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households and community groups can play an increasing role in meeting their own
needs." (World Bank, 1991:8) The rationale behind this is that the lack of government
capacity and inefficiency is seen to result in a drain on resources. This is expected to be
counteracted by greater private sector involvement in service delivery, resulting in
greater productivity levels. (Tomlinson 1994:4 1) This phenomenon emerged strongly in
the US under Reagan where many urban services, traditionally under the authority of
local government, were placed in private hands . (Cummings 1988:4) This paper does not
aim to examine the merits of these shifts, but rather to examine these interactions
between economic and political role players on the local level where local government is
having to intervene with local economies to ensure development. Coalition theories do
not suggest that such changes in the mode of production can be controlled, but that
strategies can be formulated with various actors to allow for making the most of such
circumstances. (Molotch 1988:34) Together with this, an important contextual
determinant is the international phenomenon for decentralisation of state control to more
local levels of government.
Under these circumstances, what are the reasons for the economic elite involvement in
coalitions with the political elites? Business can achieve more in partnership with local
government than it can alone because it gains access to public authority and public
revenue. (Stone 1989:233) What reasons exist for the involvement of the political elite
in economic issues? One view, such as that of Hunter, concerns the suggestion that
coalitions are formed with interest groups , including business leaders, to secure election
to office. (Parry, 1969:66) Another convincing argument promotes the idea that the
public bodies, being reliant on the income to be raised by taxing the businesses, have a
vested interests in promoting business success and advancement. (Dowding, 1994,
Stone, 1989) Collaboration of local government with the business elite could give them
access to resources that could improve their capacity to govern. (Stone 1989:234)
Traditionally, concessions were granted by the state towards certain industries. New
trends see the local state itself acting as an entrepreneur. Where the public sector
identifies potential 'growth industries , they either invest in the industry or loan money for
such investment. (Tomlinson 1994:58)
It is these changing contexts which have resulted in theories being developed that
recognise the degree of interaction that is occurring between actors and interests in local
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government levels. This paper will now focus on the two major theories vis-a-vis
interactions of elite in the arena of local governance; • namely growth machine, and
urban regime theories.
2.2 Theories of Elite Interaction
Growth machine theory of Logan and Molotch focuses on the interaction between local
government and the private sector, but the emphasis here is on the more active role and
power of business. The growth machine is thus a push of local business leaders for
policies that attends to their needs which will financially benefit them. While the local
government is responsible for the "formulation and implementation (of) growth
enhancing public development policies" it's dependence on the health and tax base of its
own local economy....has placed business elites in a privileged position" through their
control of the availability and flow of capital and credit. (Maharaj & Rambali 1996: 163
quoting Leitner, 1990: 157) The private sector commits itself to the economic growth of
the urban space, because, by attracting investment, it will .increase the profits of its
immobile land. Government support for such developments are required often because
of the control that they hold over land use decisions. (Harding 1998:43.) " Virtually all
US cities are dominated by a small, parochial elite whose members have business or
professional interests that are linked to local development and growth. These elites use
public authority and private power as a means to stimulate economic development and
thus enhance their own local business interests." (Molotch 1988:25) As such, machine
theory sits closer to the elite theory side of the spectrum than to pluralist theory. Molotch
argues that government officials who show a strong commitment to local growth
initiative are mobilised by the business elite for their own purpose. (Molotch 1988:36)
IMolotch is particularly critical of the 'parochial' business elite using public institutions
to get rich. (Molotch, 1988: 13) Why then is local government willing to engage as a
secondary partner in such machines? Government is willing to give their support for
such growth initiatives because of their reliance on the improved tax base that economic
development will generate. Furthermore, the neo-liberal assumption underlying this is
that growth will trickle down to positively affect all segments of society.' Criticisms of
I A further important method of gaining support of government official for business in the US is throuzh
contributions to political campaigns. "Campaign contributions remain the mother's mild of US politics."
(Molotch 1988:36)
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this abound. Elite theorists see that growth will enhance the position of the powerful at
the detriment of the least powerful. (Harding 1998:45)
A particularly relevant component of growth machine theory is that the business
community involved in the coalition needs to be tied to a particular place so that the
growth of that place is of particular concern to them. "Logan & Molotch's (1987) notion
of place boundedness...is central to analysing why certain sections of the business
community are committed to the prosperity of particular places and prepared to become
actors in redevelopment." (Harding: 1998:49) I Furthermore, Molotch argues that such
property entrepreneurs are more likely to have an interest in local intensification,
whereas finance, industry and commerce, while being important actors, could be
components of corporate capital which is less likely to show such interest. (Molotch
1988:27) In Keil' s study of the city of Wilkes-Barre in Pennsylvania, the growth agenda
there was significantly weakened by their dependence on national capital. (Keil
1988:270) Although Logan and Molotch emphasise the importance of local capital, they
are criticised for ignoring the influence that non-local cap ital has. While their theory is
based on the importance of the property division of business, other factors, many of
which are not locally bounded are important. (Harding 1998:44) Molotch (1988) adapts
his original theory to accommodate these contextual constraints on elite action. How
does a growth machine accommodate the often conflicting interests between business
into a unified group? Molotch's answer is based on the view that real estate investors are
core to a growth machine. Although these property entrepreneurs are in competition with
each other, they all stand to benefit with the increase in value of a locality as a whole.
This applies especially with regards economic development concentrated around the
revitalisation of a CBD. (Molotch 1998:26)
Stone's Regime Theory, on the other hand, emphasises the role of the local government
in mobilising and co-ordinating resources to affect economic development. The two
important actors in a regime are the local government and the business sector, where
government co-operates and mobilises those who hold the resources, so that they can
achieve their goals. "Urban regimes emphasise the role of the local governing coalitions
I See Keil (1988) for an analysis of the failure of a growth coalition in Wilkes-Barre in Pennsylvania due
to the dependence on national capital and the influence of national and international patterns of
accumulation.
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In shaping patterns of urban development." (Maharaj & Rambali 1996: 164) Urban
regimes are seen to be the push of the public sector. An urban regime is defined as "the
informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in
order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions." (Stone, 1989:6) As such,
regime theory is more similar to pluralist theories than to elite theories because of its
recognition of a number of different interest groups. However, like growth machine
theory, it recognises that the coalition is dominated by local government and by private
business. This lack of focus on wider social groups distinguishes regime theory from
pluralist theory. (Stoker 1998:61) Local government is seen in regime theory as it is in
pluralist theory, to be subject to some form of popular sanction or approval. As such,
Stones emphasis it is not so much a question of who rules but rather an examination of
how co-ordination is achieved and what kind of network operates.
Stone's (1989) analysis of Atlanta from 1946-1988 gives a valuable understanding to the
relationships of numerous actors to achieve certain goals. "What makes governance in
Atlanta effective is not the formal machinery of government, but, rather the informal
partnership between city hall and the downtown business elite. This informal partnership
and the way it operates constitute the city's regime; it is the means through which major
policy decisions are made." (Stone 1989:3) Here, the emphasis of Stone on the nature of
this relationship, is that it is informal in nature and based on co-operation through
solidarity and trust rather than on a hierarchical system or through bargaining. (Stoker
1998:59) The importance of this is that it is more a question of co-operation rather than
control. Here, his concept of the interactions being of a type of social production rather
than one of social control, emerges. "This leadership control, is not achieved through
ideological consideration...rather it is a result of a group of interests being able to solve
substantial collective action problems to put together a structure capable of performing
the needed function. (Stoker 1998:65) An obvious requirement here is that coalition
members have similar goals, which are not necessarily based on a similar ideology.
Stone sets out two conditions for a effective regime that can mobilise resources to
achieve a shared policy agenda: the first is knowledge of social transactions and the
capacity to act on that knowledge; the second is that there must be de facto control of
resources. (Stoker, 1998:60) De facto control would suggest that control could be
affected on the local level, rather than through a non-local corporate structure. Stoker
however emphasises that access to non-local resources can influence regime direction.
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Policy outcomes are thus shaped by three factors, the composition of the governing
coalition, the nature of the relationship between the members of the coalition, and the
resources that the different members bring to the coalition. (Stoker 1998:61)
Stone's analysis is particularly significant for Durban because during the period under
study, the make-up of the coalition changed to be a biracial one made up of a primarily
white business elite and a primarily black political elite. From the 1960' s onwards, a
shift in political power occurred in Atlanta due to an increasing black electorate and a
diminishing white electorate. This presented an important challenge to the governing
coalition that had been established. A major focus of the study undertaken by Stone was
how the coming together of coalition members is accomplished. In particular, the study
shows how co-operation was achieved across racial lines in a largely segregationist
society at the time. The black community in Atlanta in the beginning of the period under
study, was quite well organised and it was the black middle class in Atlanta that played
an important role in the regime. "Thwarted in its effort to gain (suburban) white voters
and restore the earlier electoral coalition, white business executives had to develop a
working relationship with black political leaders whose influence lay in having the votes
to control city government. (Stone 1989: 164) By ensuring co-operation with this black
middle Class, the highly organised and highly resource white business elite were able to
ensure the continuance of the regime through a variety of incentives. Incentives offered
by the growth agenda were, for example, high quality housing, small business
opportunity and employment. (Stoker 1998:63) Stone emphasises the role that this
provision of 'small opportunities' played in eo-opting support for the growth agenda in
Atlanta; black business (who would benefit financially from planned development
initiatives) and political leaders helped to push through development that in fact caused
large scale relocation of black communities. (Stone, 1989:40) Importantly therefore,
Stone found that through this alliance with white business, the black mayors were able
to initiate development plans for the benefit of the upper strata groups even though it
meant neglecting the needs of the poor black communities. (Stone 1989:166-168)
2.3 Who is excluded in this process?
Coalition forming, primarily between the business elite and the political elite, is
generally around issues of local economic development. According to classical
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economic theory, growth is presumed to trickle down and positively affect all segments
of the society. Cummings (1988) argues that coalitions are formed mostly over issues of
urban renewal. It is here where the property interest of the business elite are usually
strongest as relocation of upper and middle class people will mean money lost from their
investments. However, urban renewal is often characterised by the removal of the lower
class from the areas coalitions want to renew. This means that coalition economic
interventions are for the benefit, and, at the expense, of the poor. Actually, the poor, with
their unequal access to coalition policy making, are largely excluded from affecting
policy.' As Stone has showed, this is often to the detrime~t of the poorer segments of the
community. Stone's criticism of the coalition in Atlanta was that it was "skilled at
building physical structures but not very proficient at launching and carrying out
ambitious programmes of human development." (Stone 1989:213) Policy is determined
by the wants of coalition partners rather than by economic determinants of community
social composition (Stone 1989:160) However, neither of these two theories exclude the
potential influence of other interests such as community organisations. They can
influence development by preventing highways being built or by forcing the city to build
parks. But, as Molotch argues, they cannot change the basic course of city growth.
(Molotch 1988:37) The inclusion of various other interests in a coalition could in fact
weaken its growth agenda if it reduces cohesion, emphasised in both regime an machine
theory as being important' In the city of Wilkes-Barre, community representatives and
trade union leaders Were included in committees. However, it was partly the active and
influential nature of the trade unions that prevented significant investment in the city.
(Keil 1988:292)
Ferman (1996) is critical of machine and regime theories because they underestimate the
important influence of other interest such as CBO's She found in a comparative study
between Chicago and Pittsburgh that in Pittsburgh, change was influenced strongly by
neighbourhood groups, while in Chicago , such interest were strongly resisted.
I The emphasis on such growth initiatives at the local government level is not without its critics. Such an
emphasis is seen to be at the expense of redistributi ve policies, helping the rich, not the poor. Swanstrom' s
(1988)analysis of Cleavland highlights this fact.
2 Bennett et al year show how fragmentation hindered development of the Chicago north Loop
Redevelopment project. This fragmentation was both between the political elite and the business elite and
within the business elite themselves.
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"The examination of Chicago and Pittsburgh has highlighted the critical role of urban
arenas and the institutional frameworks of political cultures they house in influencing
the opportunities for political participation by 'non-elite interest''' . (Ferman 1996:135)
While acknowledging possible influences of other actors in Durban, this study limits
itself to the roles of the political and economic elite . Who then are the business elite and
the political elite?
2.4 The Business and Political Elite
From pluralists to elite theorists, including machine and regime theories, there is an
acknowledgement of a "top group of people" who wield greater influence than other
members of society. This "top group of people" is not merely the business or political
interest groups per se, but rather the core group of people within such groups who wield
greater influence than other group members. Where theorists diverge from one another
is the extent to which the influence of the elite is open to challenge, and the ability of
this elite to affect real change.
What remains to be examined in this chapter are some of the theories on the constitution
of this top group or elite. A simple dictionary definition of the elite is "a group of people
regarded as superior and therefore favoured. " (Oxford Dictionary, 1994) Such a
definition is along the lines of Hunter' s (1953) reputational approach where the basic
data to prove the power of the individual is seen to be the reputation for having that
power. (Harding, 1998:38) Dahl (1961) however, based his elite grouping on those who
hold the major decision making power in the city. In terms of the political elite, these
theories are relatively easy to apply. The top echelons of the political elite will be those
individuals who are in control of major decision making capacities and are reputed to be
so. However, when it comes to the economic elite, this is more difficult to determine.
Questions such as 'what constitutes major decisions making powers? ', and 'who are the
real decision makers in business?' need to be answered.
In his book, 'The Managerial Revolution ' , lames Burnham (1948) put forward his
theory that the nature of the economic elite is undergoing a fundamental shift. In this
shift, Bumham theorises that a managerial or strategic elite is replacing a capitalist or
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entrepreneurial elite and that this new ruling elite has political, administrative and
economic domination. (Parry 1969:77) His theory is based on the view that control of
the forces of production would shift. The increasingly technical nature of business has
meant that capitalists are no longer suitable or able to sufficiently direct business to an
optimal level. The task of direction and co-ordination is a highly specified function and
managers are becoming increasingly important. (Burnham 1942:75) The other feature of
business emerging at the time of his writing was that larger businesses were increasingly
becoming owned by numerous shareholders rather than by individuals. It is the role of
the managers to therefore manage these shares and the businesses. Thus, capitalists are
no longer managers of their enterprises and they now concentrate on financing, which is
seen to be removed from the productive process. (Parry 1969:51)
Why does Bumham consider these managers to be an elite grouping?
"In developed capitalist society it is evident that the position of greatest social
power and privilege was occupied by the capitalists, the bourgeoisie. The
instruments of economic production are, simply, the means whereby men live. In
any society, the group of persons controlling these means is by that very fact
socially dominant." (Burnham, 1942:27)
Burnham, in other words, sees the managerial elite as more important than the capitalist
elite. Many companies are in fact controlled by managers tied in a corporate structure
and capital is supplied by a large number of shareholders. These businesses tend to be
bigger and will tend to have more economic clout than the smaller businesses by virtue
of their size.
On the city level however, in terms of this study, the corporate or managerial elite are
less significant. While according to economies of scale, the larger companies will have
greater decision making 'powers, to what extent do these managers have real decision
making power in the national and global company? Real decision making power would
only apply to the top echelons of a corporate elite and not to the managers of the smaller
businesses. In national corporate structures, a significant amount of real decision making
is made i~ head offices, often in other localities, and only implemented by the managers
of that satellite business. This would be significant for those cities housing few head
offices. On the other hand, Bumham's predictions have not fully materialised and the
entrepreneurial elite is still significant. As discussed previously, growth coalition
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success relies heavily on the business elite having ties to the locality where urban
development is to be undertaken. A managerial elite is likely to be part of a large
corporate structure which might not be controlled or tied to that locality. A capitalist
elite on the other hand, where the instruments of production are more likely to be
controlled by and owned by an individual is likely to be smaller and tied to a specific
place. Without large corporate backing, such smaller companies are likely to be less able
to move the business where profit maximisation will be greatest. In terms of coalition
theory therefore, the entrepreneurial elite is more likely to be significant than the
managerial elite.
The hypotheses emerging therefore from this is that the political elite in Durban are the
individuals who are 'top' in terms of decision making power and reputation. The
economic elite are those individuals with decision making powers and the reputation of
having such power. Here the economic elite is comprised of both the managerial and the
entrepreneurial elite, with the managerial elite holding higher positions in the elite
grouping by virtue of the size of the companies that they represent and the greater
decision making power this confers on them. However, in terms of coalition forming,
the entrepreneurial elite could be more significant in that they have greater vested
interests in the success of the city.
2.5 Conclusion '
The various coalition theories revolve around a few central themes. Firstly, it represents
a partnership between local government and local business communities. Here there
must be a level of cohesion between members of the coalition who have similar goals.
The primary reason for this is their relationship with the success of the local economy
and the cities tax base. (Dowding 2001: 12) Also, crucially, the coalitions need to be
independent of specific leaders because "they are persuaded by economic and political
realities of the necessity for dealing with and aligning themselves for the good of the
city. (Dowding 2001: 12) Stone's research reinforces this, finding that despite several
mayors in Atlanta, the characteristics of the development coalition remained the same.
(Stone, 1989) An important point to make here is that not all coalitions have been
successful. This can be attributed to a variety of reasons. Molotch (1988) lists
determinants to coalition success as being: geographical situation of the city, the degree
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of civic leader unity, patterns of investment of outside capital, the skills of political
leaders and urban social movements. (Molotch 1988:29) Dowding (2001) suggests
criteria that are required to identify a local government coalition. The major of these
conditions are that there must exist a distinctive policy agenda that is relatively long-
term, and that it is sustained by a coalition of interests that are not institutional often
with cross-sectoral or institutional boundaries. This coalition should also be able to
survive despite changes of political leadership, and should mobilise external resources
such as public-private partnerships. (Dowding 2001: 14) It is these features which this





Understanding elite group formation and behaviour can be properly advanced through a
brief examination of its historical context. This chapter therefore seeks to analyse the
history of elite interaction in the city of Durban, and specifically focuses on the make-up
of the coalition in Durban in terms of the old white elite and the new emerging new non-
white elite. The second part of .this chapter concentrates on the emergence of this new
elite.
3.1 History of Elite Interaction in Durban
Business and government interaction for economic development in Durban is not a new
occurrence and there has in fact been a long history of such interactions in the city.
Pillay (1996) highlights the fact that since the middle of the nineteenth century, the local
government in Durban had played ' an important role in the growth in Durban,
particularly in terms of commerce and industry (Pillay, 1996:46). In fact, as Bjornvig
(1994) discovered, in the very early days of Durban's development, "local business
leaders readily established an intimate connection between economic and political
power. Many of them used their position on the Durban Town Council. .. to wield
preponderant civic influence and became the driving force in the development of the
town." (Bjornvig, 1994:iv). The dominant economic elite were largely involved in .local
politics, to the extent that many of the mayors and councillors of the time were from the
economic elite class. This economic elite engaged primarily in commercial activities,
owing to Durban's establishment as a trading centre. The strong relationship between
the economic elite and political elite was reinforced by the fact that qualification to
become a councillor was based on property ownership. (Bjomvig, 1994:47). Thus
entrenched in positions of political power, the commercial elite were tasked with the
development of the city, often serving their own interests. Bjornvig provides the
example of Mayor Hartley, a leading merchant and economic elite who macadamised
Berea road, important to the markets inland, which had obvious positive implications for
this business (1994: 156). This is but one of the numerous such examples of economic
elites in the city using their political power to advance their own vested interests through
targeted development initiatives. However, vested interests cannot be said to underlie
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all their development initiatives, and personal interests aside , this elite power group did
contribute significantly to the development of the city. Whether such interaction can be
termed a "coalition" is debatable becau se of the extreme cohesiveness of the elite
grouping to the extent that the political and economic elite were often represented in
single individuals.
As Durban continued to develop into the twentieth century, the old elite groupings were
challenged by a new emerging elite. Politically, the old power group was broken up by
the lames Commission of 1964, which was set up to investigate corruption in the
council. Purcell (1974) sees the significance of this event as promoting a change from
patronage style of decision-making to a more bureaucratic style of local governance.
(Purcell 1974:236). Purcell concludes that the bureaucracy became a very powerful
force in forging Durban's development. These changing power relations in the city
opened the way for greater participation of busine ss and other interest groups with the
political elites without the stigma or rent seeking association, of corruption or patronage
attached. However, Purcell found that such interactions in the late 1960' s between
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce were negative in nature, for their
involvement was limited to trying to restrict proposals considered harmful to their
businesses. (Purcell, 1974: 172). Signficantly, local business had important connections
to provincial government, and were often able to exert pressure through these
connections rather than through its connections with local government. (Purcell,
1974:4).
However, in the later part of the twentieth century, there have been numerous examples
of local government and business coalition activities in Durban. An important feature of
local government in Durban which was to impact significantly on economic
development initiatives and the interactions between the council and business, was the
city 's speculation in land. "The city authorities became increasingly expert at
purchasing, selling and leasing land in order to provide attractive conditions for industry
and thus bring employment to the city." (Freund, forthcoming). Here, a degree of
negotiations were required between the business and political elite. Land was
favourably allocated to some industries which fulfilled the criteria set out by the council ,
for example, job creation. (Freund, forthcoming). Another significant factor in the local
government's involvement in the economic development of the city was the
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establishment of the Capital Fund , generated from moderate rate increases. In addition
to debt reduction, this capital fund was used for significant investment initiatives. These
investments in turn generated funds that allowed for rates to be kept low, a further
attraction for investment. (Freund, forthcoming).
Freund found that the nature of the relationship between business and the local
government in Durban began to change during the 1980's. Whereas previously the city
had prescribed the (favourable) condition s under which business was given access to
cheap land , a new relationship developed based more on a public-private partnership.
Freund cites the example of the city ' s partnership with Anglo American for the
industrial development of the Springfield Flats (Freund, forthcoming).
Why the changing nature of this relationship in the 1980' s and early 1990 's? Pillay
attributes the increasing coalition-forming initiatives to a number of factors . The first is
that the economy was ailing and required constructive intervention by both government
and business to arrest the impending economic crisis. In the case of Durban, this decline
was evinced by the marked decline in key manufacturing sectors. (Pillay, 1996:74).
The second reason is that the country was undergoing a major political transition. "Local
actors intervened in order to re-assert and secure their influential role in local political
professes at a time in which they held there was much uncertainty over a future political
dispensation for the country." (Pillay, 1996:73) Against this background, Pillay argues
that such initiatives - ie. those that reflected the greater co-operation between actors -
were meant to both promote economic growth and to restructure the political order on a
non-racial basis. The best researched of such initiatives was 'Operation Jumpstart'.
Operation Jumpstart was a city-led initiative of public and private role players with the
primary aims being the promotion of the economy of Durban and job creation. It was a
stated objective of Operation Jumpstart that the initiatives would include all stakeholders
and that a compromise of interests would be sought rather than Operation Jumpstart
being representative of any single players. (Pillay 1996:76). The changing nature of the
coalition, and the more inclusive emphasis of Operation Jumpstart, were evident in the
development of an international conference facility in the city. Important players here
were not only the business community and local government, but also the ANC and
various community organisations. Robinson & Baldogh found that behind-the-scenes
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negotiations and compromises by business and local government resulted in left wing
forces being incorporated into planning processes, while the left wing found themselves
compromising in that they were moving with a process dominated by more conservative
state and business interests (1994: 196).
Out of Operation Jumpstart came projects such as those centred around the development
of Cato Manor, and importantly, the conference centre.' For many years, various actors
had suggested the building of a convention centre to stimulate the economy. Through the
forums for co-operation that were established during Operation Jumpstart, the idea
began to grow and take shape. Through its careful managing of it's resources, the city
was in a position to fund such a project. However, achieving consensus in the building
of the centre was crucial to realisation of the plan. While such a large investment by the
city for such a project was contentious because there were many other more politically
correct spending areas, the ANC gave its support to this growth vision and the building
of the city-funded, 7000 seater International Convention Centre (ICC) began in
November, 1994. Importantly for the study around growth coalitions, the Construction
Protocol of the ICC was based on Affirmative Action principles, and work to the value
of R31.1 million was given to 204 previously disadvantaged subcontractors and
suppliers. (lCC Supplement, 1997:8)2 The ICC continues to bring large amounts of
money to the economy of the city through its hosting of major international
conventions.'
Despite the success of the ICC initiative, Operation Jumpstart did have its limitations.
Pillay (1994) lists these problems as being that it essentially followed a corporatist
growth path; it was not representative of all interest groups despite its stated intention to
be so; and that it had limited strategies for growth. (Pillay, 1994:78). In reality,
according to Robinson & Baldogh (1994), Operation Jumpstart was more about business
interaction within a framework that existed to eo-opt other players into the 'coalition'
I The emphasis on the development of a conference centre follows the most recent form of urban renewal
around tourism and conventions. There are however major objections to such trends as they are seen to be
directed almost exclusively towards the affluent. (Whitt 1988:65)
2 Stone (1989) emphasises that the importance of the success of the biracial coalition in Atlanta was the
'opportunities' given to the black middle class.
3 The continuing success of the ICC is currently being challenged by the recent opening of large
convention centres in Johannesburg and Cape Town.
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that would allow for better realisation of their own business interests (Robinson &
Baldogh, 1994:210). For despite apparent consensus between various. players, business
interests still dominated. The lack of real commitment on the part of the city to the
established 'coalition' was shown by the 1992 exclusive Council-Transnet plan for the
development of the Point.
Transnet is the parastatal which owns the Port of Durban. As such, Transnet own vast
tracts of land that the Point development project had targeted for development. They
were therefore an important role player in development discussions. Planning
discussions; however, were held outside of the forums established by Operation
Jumpstart for such precisely such planning (Robinson & Baldogh, 1994:205). As Pillay
contends, the primary success of Operation Jumpstart was in that it was "one of the first
attempts at co-operative problem-solving in the locality of Durban... [and] .. .it
represented a bold and imaginative step towards the beginning to redress the seemingly
insurmountable development problem facing this metropolitan region" (Pillay, 1994:78).
Swilling points to the importance of such forums: "Local forums became the school of
the new' South African democracy. This is where networks and relationships were built,
mutual learning took place and a new culture of governance and consensus building
developed." (Swilling, 2001:219) Importantly, other initiatives emerged from the
Operation Jumpstart process. One such initiative was the Durban Functional Region
(DFR) Development Forum, which included participants from a wide range of political
parties, government bodies, civic grouping, business associations and other groups,
(Pillay, 1994:80), and later, the Greater Durban Marketing Authority (GDMA). These
were both forums which encouraged coalition type consensus building in the city of
Durban.
The dominance of the business sector in these processes needs to be further analysed to
better identify the economic elite in this process of collaboration for economic
development. The chairperson of Operation Jumpstart was the McCarthy Group
Chairperson, Terry Rosenberg. Gordon Hibbert, from the Tongaat Hulett Group, was
chairperson of the business group ' of Operation Jumpstart. Bruce Formsman, from the
property group RMS Syfrets, was tasked with attracting international investors. All of
these individuals are representative of companies important in Durban's economy.
Tongaat Hulett, and more recently, their property development division, Morelands,
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have played a major role in the forums for economic development of the city of Durban.
Morelands are important role players in the development of the land along the north
coast of the city, initially in partnership with the (old) Mt Edgecombe Local Authority.
"The relationship between Morelands and the local authority was innovative and
dynamic - a member of the company's planning division, for example, doubles
as the Town Planner for some time...Tongaat provided (from its own sources) the
bridging finance to the local authority to build up the infrastructure. These loans
were repaid annually from the rapidly escalating rateable income of the local
authority, as development followed the laying down of infrastructures. The
company laid out R150m in four years for such infrastructural development. ...
Morelands have been involved in many residential developments as well as
being involved in various industrial and commercial developments....These
Tongaat-Huletts-led developments have already radically altered working and
living patterns in the city, by halting and then slowly reversing the concentration
of economic activity in the southern Durban industrial basin." (Padayachee,
forthcoming)
Freund (forthcoming) found that Rosenberg and key players from Tongaat Huletts have
continued to play important roles in the growth coalition since democracy to "bring
together an array of interests and to establish links to key new political actors that will
promote issues central to the growth of the city."
However, any development initiative is largely reliant on access to finance for such a
project. While the local government has a capital fund that it can draw on, and a good
credit rating, the private sector also needs to gain access to finance for development
initiatives. Padayachee contends that access to finance in the city is dependent on links
to the larger corporate structure in South Africa. Companies that are locked into that
structure, such as Tongaat Hulette with its strong links to Anglo American, have easier
access to finance than those companies outside of the conglomerate structure.
(Padayachee,forthcoll1ing)
However, access to the finance to initiate development projects does not guarantee a will
or the decision making power to do so. Thus Padayachee further suggests that while
some companies have an interest in Durban's development, others do not. "Companies
such as Rennies and Grinrod, given their connections to the shipping industry have
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tended to be very concerned about the future economic prospects of the city of Durban.
Others such as Tongaat-Huletts and McCarthy's have acted in ways which have
demonstrated their interest in the wider development of the city, but their interests are
also provincial and national in character. Yet others such as Metal Box .....have tended
not to devote much of their energies into city developments." (Padayachee forthcoming)
Quite simply, then, Durban-based companies with easiest access to finance for
development tend to be corporate in nature , which effectively means that they are further
from the powerful decision-making processes of their head offices further afield.
Furthermore, according to the Monitor Report, only seven companies listed on the
Johannesburg Securities Exchange have their head offices in Durban. (Monitor Report,
page unspecified) As growth coalition shows, access to finance and real decisions
making power as well as a commitment to the specific urban locality are essential
elements in cohesive and successful coalition forming. The nature of Durban's economy
suggests that although there have been significant planning and consensus achieved
around some development initiatives for the city, much of these have emerged from
local government and business, largely composed of mostly white dominated, large,
national companies. However, while it is clear that the emergence of a new elite in the
city presents complications to coalition forming, it is the hypotheses of this paper that
this new elite also offers possibilities of overcoming problems inherited from old
development forums.
3.2 The emergence of a new elite
Before this paper can move on to examine the new elite in Durban a greater
understanding is needed of the process through which they emerged as an elite grouping.
The democratisation of South Africa, inaugurated by the country's first multiracial
elections in 1994, has put in place programmes for the upliftment of previously
disadvantaged people. Such programmes have contributed to the creation of a new, non-
white elite. However, while Apartheid policy sought to suppress non-white members of
society from developing socially, politically and economically, various commentators
have shown that the Apartheid policy in fact encouraged the creation of a non-white elite
that acted according to their own agendas. This process in fact predates Apartheid where
in the 1850's the Cape Governor at the time, Sir George Grey, built schools to educate
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the sons of chiefs. This, it was hoped, would ensure the alliance of later chiefs to the
colonial rulers (Macozoma, 2000: 14). The creation of Bantustans by the Apartheid
government further provided opportunities for the consolidation of non-white elite
creation. In order for the system to work, the leaders of the Bantustans needed to
collaborate with the Apartheid regime. This they did in exchange for various rights and
privileges (Macozoma, 2000: 14). Through this process , a non-white economic and
political elite was established and reinforced.
The incorporation of African traditional leaders into the Apartheid system underpinned
the government's policy of separate development in rural areas. Real challenges were
presented, however, with increasing migration to non-traditional, essentially white,
urban areas. Here government policy centred around "attempts at creating a 'privileged'
working class and a stable, affluent and collaborative urban petty bourgeoisie",
(Nzimande, 1991:69). This petty bourgeoisie was created in the form of a bureaucratic,
trading, civil, and from the late 1960's onwards, a corporate bourgeoisie. The creation of
a civil and bureaucratic bourgeoisie was primarily for the management of Bantustans
and other non-white areas. The trading bourgeoisie began to take advantages of the
relaxing of the restrictions on trade in African"areas, most of which were gone by 1987.
Nzimande found that there were strong links between the trading and the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie who used their positions to promote their own commercial businesses.
However, as state initiatives, the creation of the civil, trading and bureaucratic
bourgeoisie were designed not according to the principle of equality, but rather for the
purpose of reinforcing Apartheid policies. As Nzimande reminds us, this bourgeoisie,
although a elite group, was still subjugated and dependant, and existed to service the
designs of the Apartheid policy (Nzimande 1991:70).
The corporate bourgeoisie, however, were a product of capital initiatives rather than
initiatives from the state. Here, traditional white capital attempted to create a black
middle class, although, at the same time, being mindful not to place their own positions
under threat. In the context of increasing industrialisation, and especially during times of
labour unrest, capital came to identify with the benefits of having black labour under the
control of 'their own kind'. Thus began the 'Induna' system whereby blacks were placed
in managerial positions over black labour. This made it easier for capital to keep in
touch with labour and allowed for the better selection, training and control of African
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labour. Most of the new corporate bourgeoisie were therefore to be found in personnel
departments of business. Such moves were not altogether well received, and capital and
state on such business practices as it contravened legi slation such as job reservation
(Nzimande 1991: 115). Importantly, though, Nzimande points out that these moves had
little to do with black advancement and had more to do with white capital interests
(1991 :194).
However, some individuals were able to overcome significant obstacles to achieve elite
status. A prime example here is ' J.B .' Magwaza who is currently a Director of the
Tongaat Huletts Group. In line with Nzimande's assertions, ' J .B' joined Tongaat
Huletts as an industrial relations consultant (Mail &Guardian 29/09/2001). As the chair
of the group's empowerment committee his purpose was to produce a new black
commercial farming elite. The strategy of creating thi s elite is clearly beneficial to the
group itself as it adds new suppliers to the group's mills. Other large groups have similar
programmes. The reasons for both business and government moves to encourage the
growth of a non-white elite aside, the emergence of a corporate, bureaucratic, trading
and civil non-white elite had begun.
The question of the emergence of a non-white elite is complicated by the long history of
Indian elite presence in the city. Durban is distinct from other South African cities in
that it is home to a very large Indian population. Some of the local Indian families
attained elite economic status well before the onset of democracy in the country. This
can partly be attributed to the fact that while most Durban Indians originally arriving in
South Africa as indentured labourers, amongst them were a group of passenger Indians,
who were mostly Muslim merchants. Some of them already had international
connections, which was to help them develop their merchant businesses (Hart &
Padayachee, 2000:692). Hart & Padayachee give the example of the Moosa family as
falling into this category. There is therefore stratification amongst the Indian community
from the early inception of Indian bu sinesses in Durban. Many of the indentured
labourers chose to stay in Durban after their . terms of contract were completed, and
opened up shops, despite severe restrictions on trading. Thus a class of shopkeepers
emerged, who were supplied by the wholesaler 'passenger Indians'. (Hart &
Padayachee, 2000:687).
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Despite the fact that Indians, like the African populations, were actively hindered in their
development, some managed to develop thriving busines ses (Hart & Padayachee, 2000).
Indeed, prominent Indian businesses began to flourish in the post-war area, thanks
partly to the import substitution policies of the South African government, and because
of their shift from trade into industry. This was especi ally true in the clothing and
textiles industries. (Hart & Padayachee, 2000:693). Thus, an Indian commercial and
industrial elite began to emerge in Durb an. While Hart & Padayachee found that some of
these businesses benefited from close political relations with the Apartheid government
(Hart & Padayachee, 2000:689), some Indian businesses who once relied on such links
are now coming under pressure in the post-Apartheid era . Increasingly, these businesses
are under pressure due to the removal of protectionist measures in the government's
trade policies.
Different sectors in the Indian elite are encountering different fortunes. Hart &
Padayachee conclude their study by observing the various factors which have led to the
differing fortunes of some of the KwaZulu-Natal Indian businesses. Vivian Reddy, the
owner of Edison Power had links with , and consequently work for, the Apartheid
government. He has since diversified his business into various sectors and has cultivated
links with foreign investors, particularly those from Malaysia. He has also cultivated
strong links with both the ANC and IFP leadership (Hart & Padayachee 2000:706). In
contrast, other Indian businessmen are finding it difficult to break with the closed
corporate community that was encouraged by the National Party in South Africa. (Hart
& Padayachee, p684). In an interview with businessman Rajen Pillay, he emphasises the
need for Indian business in Natal to break with the micro-economy outlook that was tied
to Apartheid in order to continue its success stories. (Hart & Padayachee 2000:697)
Thus, the most successful of the surviving Indian elite are those who "have responded
with extraordinary successes to the new opportunities of the post-Apartheid era, forming
alliances with old white money, black political power, foreign Asian capital , and
Diaspora connections throughout the world to dominate the home market and more
aggressively in foreign markets as well " (Hart & Padayachee, 2000:684).
While the Indian community were faced with pressures preventing their economic
advancement, the Black community were under even greater pressures to advance as
successful businessmen. This has changed under new democratic government where
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programmes, such as Affirmative Action, procurement policies targetting the previously
disadvantaged individuals, and other Black Economic Empowerment initiatives are
actively encouraging the creation of a new non-white economic elite in the country.
The change in the political dispensation had obvious implications for the creation of new
political elite. Individuals who were once marginalised from formal governing structures
are now given ready access to those structures. Individuals from the old traditional
governing structures, labour leaders, leaders returning from exile, and prison and
community leaders are filling the political positions once reserved exclusively for
whites. While IFP and MF members of the Durban legislature will possibly have had
urban governance experience, the ANC political leaders are more likely to be from trade
unions, community based organisations, and extra state liberation movements. (Swilling
1997:227) On the local level, the notable change was in 1996 where local government
moved from its transitional phase to being wholly democratic and the new political elite
was voted into power.
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CHAPTER 4
New Elite Interaction for Economic Development in Durban? An Analysis
4.1 Who are the Elite?
Despite government commitment to rectify the racially one-sided composition of
corporate business management, there appears to be very little progress towards black
empowerment in terms of decision-making power in Durban. The top management of
most of the companies on the Durban Chamber of Commerce's Top 100 list remain
dominated by the white elite. A notable exception to this is 'JB' Magwaza, from
Tongaat Huletts and the other is a coloured man, P C September, from Rainbow
Chickens. It is in the positions of non-executive directors where we find more of the
non-white elite. However, in terms of the transformation of efficacious decision-making
power, the balance is clearly in the hands of the white executives. Two other important
exceptions to this are Lion Match Company, which is owned by First Asian Investment
Company (FASIC), and A M Moolla. Both of these companies appear on the Financial
Mail Top Black-Controlled Firms, 2000 , and are 1000/0 controlled by members of the
Indian Elite. We can deduce from this, therefore, that in terms of the corporate elite,
non-white individuals have made very little headway, despite strong government
initiatives and legislation to challenge this situation.
In terms of the entrepreneurial elite , government procurement policies are expected to
aid the emergence of a new elite, particularly in local areas through preferences given to
previously disadvantaged individuals in terms of tendering. The council spends about
RIm a day for basic services procurement. (Interview Glen Robbins) In light of the fact
that preferences in targeting are given towards Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABE)
and Women Owned Enterprises (WOE), we should expect to find that such preferential
tendering is aiding the emergence of a new elite. However, my research found that this
was not the case in Durban. Of the top 20 companies achieving the highest cumulative
value tenders in a one-year period, only six were of ABE status. Furthermore, none of
these companies were women owned. None of the directors of these 6 companies agreed
to be interviewed or to provide any information for this research. While this prevents
any conclusive remarks; it does open the doors for some speculation.
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The top ABE company, in terms of total amount awarded, is Stedone Emerging Civils.
When trying to contact Mr Dube, the person in charge of this company, ~t was found that
his offices are based at the Head Office of Stedone Construction, a non-ABE company.
The possibility exists that some of these companies are in fact established to by-pass the
affirmative action requirements of the council. One interview respondent affirmed this
view with reference to Sivukile Construction, a ABE company owned by Cyril Gwala
which has been involved in various construction projects in Durban.
"He is just there to add respectability. He is actually part of the Grinaker LGA
syndicate. One of his companies will be awarded a contract for the development
of the Point Marine Park but I don't know how much he is getting himself."
(Interview Don Mkwanazi)
While Sivukile does not feature as an applicant or awardee of the City Council's
council's tendering process in the year under study, it does suggest that there is a degree
of "fronting" of traditional white-owned companies by ABE companies in Durban. This
is a possible reason why some of the tender-awarded companies are reluctant to be
interviewed. The third highest ABE beneficiary of tenders in terms of cumulative value
from the city, was Nascon Projects. They had received some high profile contracts such
as the R104-million Durban International Airport renovation contract. However, in the
middle of the project, the company had 'gone bust'. (Daily News, 28/2/2001) While this
company would not agree to an interview, lan Bell, of the Tenders Office of the Unicity,
attributes this sort of failure to some of the ABE companies overextending themselves
and taking on more contracts than they have the capacity to fulfil.
Clearly therefore, the absence of effective ABE companies emerging out of the tender
process hinders new elite creation. This is compounded by the fact that there is a lack of
capacity to use the contracts awarded to become elite entrepreneurial businessmen, as in
the case of Nascon Projects. If it is the case, as I have speculated, that some of the ABE
companies are mere fronts for traditional white businesses, the 'owners' of such
companies cannot be seen to have real decision-making power in terms of Dahl's
qualification for elite status. This lack of new elite status is further underlined by the fact
that none of the directors or owners of these companies were listed by the interviewees
as having the reputation of elite status. If such individuals cannot therefore be
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considered elite (according to Hunter' s reputational approach), who then can be
accorded elite status in the city of Durban ?
Using Hunter's reputational approach of elite identification it emerged that there is no
cohesive new elite grouping in the city. In fact , the 'new' elite emerging from this
process actually pre-date the 1994 transformation. Three of the interviewees were not
prepared to state who, in their opinion, the elite in Durban were. (Interview McCarthy,
Brink, Robbins) Others expressed various reservations about naming who they thought
the new economic elite were. However, five respondents gave their opinions of who they
perceived the economic elite in Durban to be. While this analysis runs the danger of
being skewed due to the small number of respondents in this regard, it does serve to
highlight a few issues around who the reputed economic leaders in the city are.
Firstly , there is clearly no cohesive elite grouping in the city . Five respondents named a
total of 31 economic elite members. Of these , 25 were mentioned by only one
respondent. Three names were mentioned twice and one name mentioned three times.
The only two exceptions to this were Don Mkwanazi and Vivian Reddy, who were
mentioned by all respondents as being important economic role-players in the city. This
can be attributed to a number of reasons. The first is that neither of these two
businessmen are 'new ' elite figures in that both have been important players in the
business environment for many years. Vivian Reddy, of Edison Power, has been making
a name for himself in business for the past 15 years. He has built his company up and in
that time has acquired contracts to the value of RI billion. (Hart et al :705) He is
majority owner in SAM Sisonke, a Malaysian and South African Joint Venture, and is
also involved in the Sugar Mill Casino outside of Durban. (Hart et al :706) Similarly,
Don Mkwanazi has been working in business, especially in areas of Black
Empowerment for as many years. His reputation as a business leader can largely be
attributed to his reputation as such, rather than his business activities. He has been
involved in the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(INYANDA), the IFP business outfit, has been an advisor to the DCC since the 1980's,
and was a senior economic advisor to the ANC. Furthermore, he was the manager of the
Black Management Forum for many years. (Interview Don Mkwanazi) His reputation
might not only come from positive business involvement. Mkwanazi gained large-scale
media coverage for his allegedly corrupt practices while in the position of chair of the
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Central Energy Fund, and for his subsequent suing of the Mail and Guardian Newspaper
for articles relating to this scandal. (Mail and Guardian 19/02/2001) The reputation of
these two as Business leaders is also bolstered by their involvement in business
initiatives such as the Durban Investment Promotions Agency (DIPA). (This subject will
be returned to shortly). Hart & Padayachee noted that the ability to form alliances with
the new regime is an important determinant of the success businesses. "Besides being
well connected to the highest echelons of the ANC, Vivian Reddy makes sure that the
Zulu King and Chief M. Buthelezi, the Inkatha leader are prominently associated with
his businesses." (2000:706) Mkwanazi also acknowledges the importance of such links.
With strong links to the ANC leadership, he also has links to Inkatha, important in a
business environment in KZN. "I also happen to be very close to the King of Zululand".
(Interview Mkwanazi)
Neither of these two new economic elite, Vivian Reddy or Don Mkwanazi are products
of affirmative action. This, as the interviews showed, is an important reason for them
being regarded as elite representative. There appears to be, amongst the respondents
surveyed, a sense of disdain towards elite status achieved through affirmative action.
Conversely, there is great admiration towards elite status achieved despite barriers
placed by the Apartheid government. Clear evidence of this is the fact that only two
respondents suggested JB Magwaza as a member of the economic elite • despite his
extensive business involvement and black economic empowerment initiatives, the wide
media coverage that he receives for his programmes, and the fact that he is an executive
member of a very powerful corporate business, Tongaat Huletts. Comments from other
respondents further back up the positive reputational value of non-black empowerment
success:
"What we like about them is that they have worked. These names that I have just
mentioned, they are not a product of empowerment. They have just worked for
whatever they have got. This thing of affirmative action is a thing for yesterday.
They have already been there, they were already there before affirmative action
took place" (Interview Johannes Mile)
Who then are the real important economic role players in the city? There is very little
argument among the respondents that although there is an emergence of a new elite, the
real power still lies with the traditional white elite.
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"The white elite have been in control all along" (Interview Don Mkwanazi)
"I just think that their size and the importance of their role.means that they are a
voice that does have an impact" (Interview Lyn Ploost van Amstel)
In the light of this, the Durban business community is seen to be relatively
untransformed. (Interview Glen Robbins) Robbins attributes this to the satellite nature of
the Durban companies. While restructuring occurs at the head offices in Johannesburg,
he feels that it has not significantly filtered down to the satellite offices in various parts
of the country. This results in the major corporate entities exerting powerful influence in
the city by virtue of their size and their backing, while the control of these companies
remain in the hands of the white elite. In particular, Mondi and Tongaat Huletts are seen
to be the important players in this regard. However, most respondents do not feel that
this is necessarily a bad thing.
"It is still dominated by the white males in particular by virtue of them being in
business for quite some time. There is no short way to buy experience. The only
way to buy experience is by being exposed.....we still remain dominated by it
will take time, a 40 year forecast building the individuals, but , we will get there."
(Interview Nozipho Sithole)
Other respondents emphasised the important experience that the white elite could offer,
saying that if this were lost, it would negatively impact on the economy of Durban.
(Interviews with Johannes Mile , Nozipho Sithole) However, some respondents, in
acknowledging the continued dominance of the white elite , highlighted the potential
negative implications of this fact.
"This has been one of the issues of conflict between the ANC and the business
community; there hasn't really been a sense that Durban traditional businesses
have taken the lead in transforming themselves to become the new vehicles of
empowerment, which is what the ANC would have looked for" (Robbins)
This lack of transformation is most clearly shown by the lack of females emerging
during the examination of the tendering process and through the decision-making
process. National and local government are committed to the empowerment of
previously disadvantaged groups , 'especially women, through preferential treatment in
tendering and job promotions. However, no women-owned company emerged as having
received a high cumulative total of tenders. Furthermore, no respondents listed a woman
as having elite status - despite the role held by Nozipho Sithole. As CEO of Portnet's
49
Port Authority Nozipho Sithole holds a very important decision-making position in a
parastatal which is key to Durban's economy. Furthermore, she is actively involved ·in
economic development programmes such as the Point Waterfront Development and
DIPA. Despite this, no respondents listed her as an elite figure.
"I do not get a sense that there is a commitment towards the development of
women to higher levels in this Durban environment. Black empowerment is
creating a male black elite and the females are being neglected. All that we have
done is push race in favour of the black male. We have not taken a conscious
effort to push the gender perspective as well. This makes my job more difficult.
People do not give me the respect they would if I was a man." (Interview,
Noziph Sithole)
Ploos van Amstel agrees with these sentiments, though she observes that that the
problem is not exclusively in the business sector:
"I don't ever see the same emphasis being placed on the gender issue as you get
on the racial issue .....You don 't see the same push for gender equity in
employment practices for the council as you do for racial equality." (Interview
Lyn Ploos van Amstel)
Another important body in the workings of local governance and development is the
bureaucracy. While not included in the focus of this study, it is important to discuss
briefly their role in the economic development of the city. Purcell (1974) outlined how
influential the bureaucracy was during the 1960's in effecting economic development in
the city. However, it appears as if the bureaucracy has lost much of its autonomous
power since the new political dispensation. This is evinced by two main characteristics
in Durban's local government: the tendering process, and the process through which
plans are accepted. The Tender Board which decides on tender applications used to
consist primarily of individuals drawn from the bureaucracy, with political and business
representatives included to aid the process. However, this has changed to a process
whereby the entire board is composed of council members, and chaired by a political
elite, Executive Council member, Visven Reddy. The tender office staff have therefore
been removed from the decision-making process altogether and their roles are confined
to administrative ones. This is causing considerable frustration to these staff members.
(Interview Ian Bell) In terms of the process through which plans are implemented in the
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council, there appears to also be a centralisation in decision-making away from the
bureaucracy.
"Lets say the issue comes from whoever, the community or from an individual
from the council. The process is from the committee level and them it goes to
Exco. At that level I am involved because before we make a decision we need to
be clear about whether it is worth it and also with the advice of the technical
official that are there." (Interview Mina Lesoma)
Again, the bureaucrats seem to be losing autonomous decision-making power. This is
potentially harmful to coalition-forming activity because of the significant experience
and technical expertise that they have.
This lack of cohesiveness between the still prominent white elite and the black political
elite presents a significant stumbling block for coalition-forming for the economic
development of the city. This could be further limited by the marginalisation of the
bureaucracy in the planning and decision-making process. However, the city of Durban
does have a history of big, white business collaborating for the development of the city.
Furthermore, it is also not devoid of interactions between the black elite, both political
and economic. This analysis now moves on to examine these interactions.
4.2 Elite Interactions
There is a clear historical and cultural background that lays the basis for black economic
and political elite interaction.
"Largely, we come from the same background of being educated in the
townships and gone to varsity together. Some are fellow church members and
there is a certain level of interaction on those different levels. But, then again, I
think that the Durban business community is a small one so every black
businessman has a pretty good idea of who does what in other spheres of
business. Therefore, there is a growing business brotherhood out there."
(Interview Cyril Gwala)
Despite the particularly brutal violence that occurred in the latter days of Apartheid, this
interaction seems to cross party lines. Mile attributes this to the fact that the new black
elite come largely from the same areas , and are, in a sense, family. Such 'brotherhood'
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sentiments could lay the basis for greater elite interaction and co-operation based on
trust, an important determinant in coalition success. The extent of this cohesion,
however, is questionable, for economic leaders were largely nominated along racial and
party political lines. In addition, as Robbins maintains, black elite interaction appears to
be based more on economic and 'power in numbers' principle s than on a common
heritage.
"Black entrepreneurs feel that they need to co-operate to access opportunities
that are there. They often feel that they are the small brothers and sisters of the
bigger black empowerment initiati ves in Johannesburg. For example, Tongaat
Huletts is in the process of unbundling, and no-one locally has the finance to
purchase that interest. So, they have to go to Johannesburg to hunt the finance ,
they have to go to the bigger empowerment consortiums in order to reach critical
mass to play these critical roles." (Interview Glen Robbins)
He goes on to assert that the coalition of black business in Durban is relatively weak. As
other interviewees agree, this coalition is particularly weak in the context of the
persistent dominance of the white controlled big business in Durban.
However, the political make-up of the Executive Council of the Unicity does to a degree
facilitate greater co-operation between the new elites in the city . The Executive Council
is ANC dominated, and further strengthened by an informal alliance with the !FP and
the MF. The key positions of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and the Speaker, are filled
by ANC personnel. The strong representation of the 'new' elite in the powerful top
echelons of the political structure is important for interaction between the new economic
elite and the local government. This confers a degree of power to the black elite which is
largely beyond the reach of the white economic elite. Importantly, access to the city is
made easier. (Interviews Glen Robbins, Jeff McCarthy)
"This depends what we are talking about. If we are talking about accessing
government and government programmes and thinking, the black elite will
obviously have more influence. However, if we are talking about the access to
finance and investment internally, then the old elite will have more influence.
From a political base, if YO'u need something to get economic benefit, the new
elite will have strong influence., but in terms of knowledge and investment, the
old elite still has that strong hold ." (Interview Noziph Sithole)
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Clearly, therefore, the old and the new economic elite have potential benefits which can
be brought to a coalition with the political elite for the economic development of the
city.
This paper now moves on to examme In more detail this relationship between the
economic elite and the political elite, specifically, in terms of the economic development
of the city. The integrated and pervasive powers of the traditional white economic elite
have been examined above. So too, has the emerging influence of the new elite, although
of a different nature. The examination that follows seeks to determine the nature of these
relationships. To this end, we need to understand why the political elite are extending
their traditional roles of service and infrastructure provision to one where they are
interacting more with business to encourage economic growth .
There is little doubt that economically the city of Durban is in dire need of attention. All
respondents agreed on this reality, which was clearly expressed by the Monitor Report.
For city planners, this is a serious issue, and increasingly political elites are becoming
involved in economic processes. Glen Robbins from the Economic Development
Department of Durban, cites two reasons for this The first is the national and regional
emphasis on achieving growth and the explicit calls for this to be encouraged through
local government. In particular, this is necessary for employment creation to address the
needs of the historically disempowered electorate. The second reason put forward by
Robbins is the need for local government to maintain its sustainability. Most of local
government income is generated through taxing businesses.
"About 680/0 of all income generated by local government comes from industrial
or commercial sources, either through the rates on their properties or though a
special business levy, or through the profits we make on supplying them with
water and electricity." (Interview Glen Robbins)
This has not been a particularly difficult task in the past, considering it was within the
financial scope of the city to do this. However, as part of the mandate from national and
regional government, the city is now required to extend its services to previously
disadvantaged people in a much wider geographic region in terms of "the new city
boundaries.
"For example, in the last seven years, the council has escalated its expenditure
programme by about 300 to 400%. That means that we've had to generate an
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additional 300-4000/0 income. It is thus imperative to then get the growth that
will then fund that expenditure." (Interview Glen Robbins)
This has contributed to the local government playing an increasingly active role In
stimulating the economy of the city .
What forms are these interactions taking? The most significant of these is the Durban
Investment Promotion Agency (DIPA). The primary goal of this agency is to try and
promote investment in the city. This process emerged from the recommendations of the
Durban Best Practice City Commission. Thi s commission was set up at the behest of the
city to come up with recommendations about what interventions were required to make
Durban a preferred investor destination. Neel s Brink of Morelands, Cyril Gwala of
Sivukile Construction and Themba Ncgobo, a lawyer, were the commissioners. The
rationale behind the Agency is that the treatment of investors in the city was not very
good, and thus did little to encourage them to invest. Robbins considers this initiative to
be an important private-public initiative between council, white business and black
business. (Interview Robbins) The board and .CEO of DIPA has just been elected and
they should be up and running by the beginning of January. The new Chairperson is Don
Govender, formally of Eskom, who has been working in their International Business
Development Department. The rest of the board is made up of two members of the
political elite, (Mlaba, Naidoo ,), one repre sentative of a Parastatal (Sithole) with the
other members representing busine ss (Mkwanazi, Reddy, Hibbert, Clarke , Ngcobo,
Rosenberg and Siwendu). Other observers, however, question the capacity of the people
on the board to achieve the aims, saying that the appointments are more political in
nature than anything else. (Interview Mick Hyatt)
The other important and very recent initiative which involves both the private and the
public sectors is the imminent development of the Point Waterfront which is to be
known as Shaka Island. The development of this valuable land has been on the cards for
many years but has continuously been stalled. Despite these delays, the concept and
plans were finally launched on the 17 October 2001. In the planning and negotiating
stage , Neels Brink played the key role and Cyril Gwala, was the deputy director of the
project team. The council has allocated R350m of its equity funding for this project,
with the remainder of the R650m being sourced from other funders. The city thus
remains the major stakeholder. (Interview Neel s Brink) Brink considers this project as
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an important three way partnership; "Public, local government, parastatals, (the
Development Bank and the .Industrial Development Corporation) and then Private
Banks" (Interview Neels Brink)
Clearly, there is therefore a growing interaction between the economic and political elite
in the city of Durban. What remains to be done in this research is to investigate further
the extent of this interaction. Do we have a growth coalition in the city? There are
numerous references in the media to the 'Durban Growth Coalition'. The opening
address to the Second Durban Economic Growth Summit, welcomes the members of the
growth coalition. But, do these interactions occurring in Durban constitute a growth
coalition according the theoretical frameworks established earlier in this thesis. To
recap, the conditions for a growth coalition are a distinctive policy agenda that is
relatively long term, which is sustained by a coalition of interests that is not institutional,
often with cross-sectoral or institutional boundaries. Furthermore, it should be able to
survive despite changes in political leadership and should mobilise external resources
such .as Public-Private Partnerships. (Dowding 2001: 14)
There is no doubt from the evidence gathered' that there is a large degree of interaction
between the political and economic leadership in the city. While there are clearly limits
to the extent of this interaction, the basis has being laid for further interaction. The most
prominent of the various forums that are being developed or expanded upon are the
Durban Business Vision, the DIPA and the Durban Economic Growth Summits.
Interactions around these initiatives are involving business, both black and white, local
government, provincial government and other stakeholders. Furthermore, interactions
continue through well established structures such as the Durban Chamber of Commerce.
Dahl discusses a coalition of interests that are not institutional. The forums mentioned
above are institutional, and the policies emerging form this are consequently institutional
as well. What matters to Dahl are the non-institutional policy agendas. Here Stone
emphasises a common agenda which relies on networks of trust and co-operation rather
than formal structures. Thus, we can surmise that a strategic agenda moving in the same
direction is required of both private and public bodies for a coalition in Durban to be
effective.
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In terms of the political elites, the general focus is similar to that of business. Both are
looking for a growth-oriented strategy for economic development. Or, as Mkwanazi puts
it, "sustainable economic growth to increase the cake, if you don't increase the cake,
equitable participation of all the citizens of Durban will not happen." (Interview Don
Mkwanazi) The two key political elites in this process , the Mayor Obed Mlaba and the
Deputy Mayor and chair of the Economic Development Committee of the city, Logie
Naidoo, are strong proponents of such growth strategies. There is therefore a general
consensus about the direction to be followed in planning strategies.
Robbins however, denies the existence of a growth coalition in Durban saying;
"I don't think that there is sufficient actual co-operation and alignment between
the work of local government and key businesses at the moment to say that they
are a coalition. There are a few projects that have emerged that have their origins
before that process began and some of them are from that process. But, projects
do not constitute a coalition. They could be the building blocks for something in
the future, but there is still not a sense that government has given up or begun to
share strategic power with the business community in that sense which is what a
growth coalition is about, a kind of strategic power sharing arrangement where
commitments are made around budgets, projects and points of focus and
objectives, where parties agree and contribute to the process. So far, it has been
business, both black and white saying that this is what we want, what can we
help to get council to give us what we want rather than trying to share the
programme, and commit business to it in terms of their own resources and
commitments." (Interview Glen Robbins)
This sentiment was strongly agreed to by Hyatt. (Interview, Mick Hyatt)
So while the general direction of development planning in the city is similar between the
political elite and the economic elite, it is in the policy-making around this common
agenda where a coalition activity is limited. However it is important to note that the fact
that the political elite are following this long-term, growth-oriented strategy is not
without its potential problems which has the potential to upset the political leadership in
the city. (Interviews Lyn Ploos van Amstel, Don Mkwanazi) Ploos van Amstel explains
that the mayor and the deputy mayor in particular are strong supporters of the approach
that is currently been taken towards economic growth. They are both from a business
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background and many of their policy directions are based on concerns raised in the
Monitor report. Another factor mentioned during the interview process as being a
hindrance to continued coalition activity is the lack of political capacity to direct
coalition building. (Interviews Mick Hyatt, Jeff McCarthy, Don Mkwanazi, Glen
Robbins) Furthermore, as Ploos van Amstel goes on to explain, these policy choices are
not free from major challenges from within the ANC caucus. The budget prioritisation
for this year is tipped towards long-term economic growth.
"But, there was a lot of resistance, particularly from the ANC caucus, but from a
whole range of political parties to the emphasis on investment in economic
infrastructure. They mayor got away with it this year but I don't think that he will
be able to in future years. There is certainly a very vocal group within his party
saying that they do not like what he is doing." (Interview Lyn Ploos van Amstel)
While Ploos van Amstel could, as leader of the opposition in the council, have vested
interests in being sceptical about ANC support within the council, it is entirely feasible
that councillors who represent poorer communities are not happy with financing that
concentrates on large development projects. While business on the whole, and the
official opposition party is very happy about the direction that the mayoral policies have
taken, the citizens, or more importantly the voters, might not share these views. The
implication of this is that the growth-oriented political elite might not survive challenges
that might emanate from such emphases on economic growth.' However, in Stone's
analysis of Atlanta, the new political elite were able to ensure continued support of the
black electorate through the provision of 'small opportunities' to the black middle class,
even through growth strategies were detrimental to the black poor. The extent to which
such small opportunities are been given to black businessmen in Durban is debatable
given the flaws in the tendering process and the lack of a clear and strong black elite
emerging in the city. This brings us back to the requirements of Dahl for a growth
coalition - that it survives changes in leadership. It remains to be seen if a change in
leadership will allow the coalition, if indeed there is one, to proceed. This is particularly
relevant because of the important role that the Mayor, Obed Mlaba is playing in bringing
together elite actors for the 'Unicity vision '.
I It is interesting to note that on a national level , there are increasing cracks in the Congress of South
African Trade Union, South African Congress Party and ANC alliance over the growth orientated and
privatisation strategies of the government.
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While there is clearly interaction between the political and economic elite in Durban for
a vision that is structured around economic growth in the city, there is as yet no strategic
joint decision-making. Such interaction cannot therefore be termed a growth coalition,
despite numerous references to this effect in the forums around economic development.
What then is the potential for the groundwork to become a coalition in a more power
sharing way?
The first hindrance must be the fact that the important economic players in the city are
still those from the white-owned and white-controlled businesses. While not explicitly
stated by any of the respondents, the continuing lack of consensus between white
business and local government must be considered to be a hindrance to this process. The
other reason, albeit one having less impact, is the lack of a cohesive black economic elite
grouping, as discussed earlier in this paper. Robbins states that the groupings that exists
are inadequate in terms of cohesion, and lack a dynamic leadership to drive the process
forward. However, both of these factors have potentially positive implications for the
future. As Robbins explains, while coalition-forming is, to some a degree, hindered by
the nature of big, white business, this can be overcome by the successful emergence of
the smaller, locally based, non-white businesses.
"We have many huge challenges, both social and economic. This could have
very significant benefits in creating a period of alignment. What we have in
terms of the most powerful business interests are people with a profile of
business activities in traditional sectors of the economy. But, the economy is
rapidly changing. Our important' players around the table are Anglo American
players in terms of Mondi and Tongaat 'Huletts, both commodity centred
businesses, which in ten years time, the world is going to change very much. If
you look at some of the coalitions that have been successful elsewhere, they have
not had their foundations on the 'biggest is best approach'. It has often been
those businesses that are on the cusp of growth opportunity who show more
innovation and have a sustained interest in the growth of a particular place and a
commitment to that place. One of the things that needs to be confronted is that
you need a leadership team who are going to be very important in the economy
in the future. They are the most important right now. You need to catch them at




This paper set out to examine the elite interactions for econ omic development in the city
of Durban within the contexts of changing local government responsibilities and global
and national pressures. Furthermore, it aimed to examine the nature of these
relationships in the light of the emergence of a new political and economic elite. As such
it required an examination of theorie s pertaining to the elite, as well as an analysis of
how they interact on local levels , specifically around issues of economic development.
The study also required that the socio-economic and political conditions obtaining in
Durban be placed in their historical contexts. Consequently, an examination was made
of how the elite has interacted throughout Durban ' s development. It was furthermore
necessary to examine the background to the elite creation in post-Apartheid South
Africa.
What has emerged is that there is little progress being made in the city in terms of a
strong new elite grouping being created. Using both a reputational and decision-making
process to identify the elite in the city , the limited succe ss of government policy for the
empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals became visible. In the case of the
entrepreneurs - some of whom appear to act as front s for other businesses - this group
was seen to hold limited real decision-making power. In terms of the corporate elite ,
there has been limited transformation, and the city of Durban still appears to lack a new
non-white, corporate elite who could harness the vast resources of the corporate
companies for development initiatives. This failure to find a significant new elite could
however be attributed to the limits of the targetting methodology employed. However,
and perhaps more importantly, it is clear that there is no definite new economic elite
grouping in the city. While some individuals are coming to the fore as business leaders,
they are divided, and are not recognised as such by the other elite in the city.
This can partly be attributed to the ' continued domination of the white elite in the
business sector. This is not necessarily seen to be a bad thing, but it does have
implications for successful coalition-forming in the city. Informal networks of elite
individuals, based on trust, are emphasised by Stone as being essential for successful
growth coalitions. These networks are less prominent between the white business elite
59
and the black political elite, limiting real coalition creation. A further limiting factor to
successful coalition-type economic development initiatives is the fact that many of the
companies currently involved in development projects are part of a national corporate
structure. The various coalition theories examined here emphasise the significance of
locally bounded companies who have a real interest in the future of the city 's economy.
This study has shown that the some of the companies currently involved in coalition
type economic development projects are not locally bounded. Therefore, Stone and
Logan and Molotch's versions of growth coalitions do not exist in Durban despite
various references thereto.
This is not to say that a possibility does not exist for future growth coalition
establishment. Clearly the groundwork has been laid for co-operation for economic
development initiatives. Furthermore, the elite appear to have a common agenda, - that
of a long-term strategy for a growth-orientated development framework. This common
agenda is essential for coalition forming. Furthermore, there are close ties between the
emerging new economic elite and the political elite. This historical background could lay
the foundations for the informal networks essential for successful coalition initiatives.
Furthermore, these new emerging businesses are more likely to be locally bounded with
the economic future of the city. Only then can a powerful elite network be established
that will co-operate to implement a common agenda for the economic development of
the city. However, the city continues to engage with the traditional elite and the limited
new elite. Until such time as the visions and commitment of the new entrepreneurs are
included in projects to aid the economic development of the city , a 'growth coalition'
will not be established according to theoretical model s.
The express intention of this paper was to raise a number of questions as to elite
formation in the city of Durban. One such question is whether growth coalition around
economic development have aided the rich at the expense of Durban's poor. Theorists
such as Stone and Ferman have highlighted this trend - it needs to be asked whether this
is the case in Durban. Also , what are the potential political and economic implications
of deepening poverty and marginalisation within the city? While Durban is clearly in
need of development strategies to attract investment, improve growth and create jobs,
such economic development strategies based on a "trickle down" principle could be to
the detriment of the many poor in the city. Durban' s high poverty levels, low levels of
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housing and infrastructure, low employment and high AIDS infection rates warn of a
real danger in focusing on strategies that serve the rich at the detriment of the poor.
Economic development cannot be done at the expense of the many people who might be
negatively effected while at the same time creating a new class of elite. Rather,
strategies need to be found that will aid economic development and development in the
wider sense of the word. What the long term effects of the current growth strategies of
the city role players will be on both the rich and the poor will be a true reflection of the
success of the city 's development agenda. This will require the commitment and vision
as well as involve the capacity of all role players. Clearl y, Durban has far to go before
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Appendix C
Table showing Businesses who achieved the top 20 cumulative value Durban City
tenders for one year period, Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2000
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Company Name Total Amts in R No. of Contracts ABE Status
ABB (Install. Powertech &Transmission) 30,576,157.00 7 Non-ABE
Alston (Various Departments) 20,629,594.00 10 Non-ABE
Profour Projects 14,522,722.00 4 Non-ABE
Inisa Power & ABB Transmission & Dist. 10,933,813.00 1 Non-ABE
African Cables 10,279,071.00 3 Non-ABE
Sasol Chemical Industries 10,260,000.00 1 Non-ABE
Stedone Emerging Civils 9,708,951.00 9 ABE
W K Construction 9,614,000.00 5 Non-ABE
Roadcon Construction 7,350,000.00 4 Non-ABE
Ubunye Plant Hire 6,950,000.00 1 ABE
Fuhri & Sons 6,409,000.00 6 ABE
North Coast Mining & Civils 5,622,666.00 2 ABE
Nascon Projects 4,988,565.00 3 ABE
Durant Civils 4,899,789.00 2 Non-ABE
Kaldrys Construction 4,671,900.00 1 ABE
Beka Lighting 4,545,772.00 1 Non-ABE
Durban Civils 4,448,000.00 4 ABE
Indiana Projects 4,071,000.00 1 Non-ABE
Citi Guard Cash 3,985,440.00 2 Non-ABE
Revenue & Metering Solutions 3,923,000.00 1 Non-ABE
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